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PURSUING PROBLEM-SOLVING OR PREDICTIVE
SETTLEMENT
CRAIG A. McEWEN*
H AS the initial promise of ADR to reorient the practice of law
toward a higher quality, problem-solving approach been co-
opted by the legal establishment, absorbed and blunted by "the adver-
sary culture" of American law? Carrie Menkel-Meadow answers a
qualified "yes," and her case for co-optation provides the central
theme of her rich and provocative reflections on "Pursuing Settlement
in an Adversary Culture."' ADR, she points out, has become highly
professionalized as dispute resolution organizations have proliferated
and apparently prospered. A specialized field of law with its own law
reporter and law treatises has developed around ADR.2 The practice
of ADR itself appears to have become more rule-bound and adversar-
ial as a body of law has developed to regulate and implement it. All of
these observations are on the mark, but the resulting conclusion about
ADR's co-optation requires further examination in the light of a more
highly differentiated view of ADR.1
I. DIFFERENTIATING ADR
"ADR" and the "ADR movement" have, of course, been widely
adopted as convenient, short-hand ways of describing a complex of
interests, activities and goals, individuals and groups. The most per-
ceptive commentators-like Menkel-Meadow-recognize vast differ-
* Daniel B. Fayerweather Professor of Sociology, Bowdoin College. A.B., 1967, Obeiiin
College; Ph.D., 1975, Harvard University. I wish to thank Nancy Rogers for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-opted or "The Law of ADR, " 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1991).
2. In fact, as second author of a treatise on the law of mediation, I suppose that I have
contributed to the legalization of ADR. See N. RooEs & C. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW POLICY
PRACTxCE (1989).
3. In dwelling on the issue of co-optation, I neglect the wide range of other issues which
Menkel-Meadow's rich essay addresses. For example, her Article explores insightfully the ten-
sions between openness and privacy of dispute resolution proceedings and outcomes and presents
a rethinking of the appropriateness of mandating ADR procedures. See generally Menkel-
Meadow, supra note I. See generally Law and Public Policy Committee of the Society of Profes-
sionals in Dispute Resolution, Report #1, Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion: Dis-
pute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts (1990). The paper also poses a series of important
questions for empirical research and policy debate.
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ences, however, in the goals and claims of those who embrace ADR.
She clearly distinguishes, for example, between those who embrace
"quality" of process and outcome in their advocacy of ADR and
those who embrace efficiency or quantity of settlement in their sup-
port for it. 4 In fact, this central difference has profound implications
for the relationship between dispute resolution processes and the "ad-
versary culture." Yet that very distinction is lost when the analysis
returns to unitary "ADR" (or to settlement-another concept used
generically here and in much commentary elsewhere). As a result, we
miss the extent of the co-optation of "ADR" on the one hand, and,
on the other, evidence of its modest transformative effects on law
practice.
Let us begin with a central distinction among ADR or settlement5
processes-one between predictive settlement procedures and prob-
lem-solving settlement procedures.6 In the former category are all of
the devices which are organized to affect the parties' predictions of
what might happen at trial and thus to encourage settlement. Non-
binding arbitration, 7 early neutral evaluation,8 summary jury trials, 9
4. For a somewhat more complex, but nonetheless parallel, analysis of the makeup of the
ADR movement, see Silbey & Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From
Insfitutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DEN. U.L. REv. 437
(1989).
5. Sometimes "settlement" has been used almost interchangeably with "ADR" or is em-
ployed as if it were the opposite of adversarial practice. However, settlement is a more inclusive
concept than ADR. In addition, although the tensions between settlement and advocacy are
readily apparent, the two are not mutually exclusive. Clearly, the adversarial culture Menkel-
Meadow describes often promotes settlement in the context of advocacy. Thus, it is the aspira-
tion for "nonadversarial" problem-solving settlement that challenges the adversarial culture, not
settlement itself.
6. This distinction has emerged in discussions with Nancy Rogers and, in fact, permeates
many discussions of ADR, although the labels may not be the same. See, e.g., Alfini, Summary
Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Partici-
pating Lawyers, 4 Omo ST. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 213 (1989); Keating and Shaw, "Com-
pared to What?" Defining Terms in Court-Related ADR Programs, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 217
(1990); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
7. See E.A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE
FEDERAL DISRICT COUnRTS (1981); E.A. LIND, R. MACCOUN, P. EBENER, W. FEISTINER, D.
HENSLER, J. RESNIK & T. TYLER, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LmOANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL,
COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989) [hereinafter
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE]; S. CLARK, L. DONNELLY & S. GROVE, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN
NORTH.CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS (1989); Hensler, What We Know and Don't
Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986).
8. See, Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort
to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986).
9. See J. ALFiN, L. GRIFITHS, R. GETCHELL & D. JORDAN, SUMMARY JURY TIALS IN
FLORIDA: AN EmPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1989); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative
Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and
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mini-trials, 0 and even, perhaps, some settlement conferences," pro-
vide the parties a chance to try out their adversarial presentations and
to have some assessment of the outcome by a "neutral" third party.
These procedures do not challenge the traditional model of
"litigotiation' '1 2 in which adversarial settlement negotiations occur in
the context of discovery and pretrial motions and in the shadow of a
likely adjudicated outcome. 3
In problem-solving settlement, by contrast, the central goal is not to
predict what a court would do. Instead, the standard for a good out-
come is whether or not it meets the needs and responds to the underly-
ing interests of the parties and, perhaps, appears generally "fair" or
"just.' ' 4 These criteria for good outcomes may differ sharply from
those for predictive settlement where the sole reference point is what is
legally attainable-that is, an outcome that the parties might reasona-
bly have expected to achieve at trial.
Mediation, in particular, has been advocated as a problem-solving
process, and it is to mediation (along with some forms of negotiation)
that Menkel-Meadow repeatedly returns to exemplify her image of
what the "quality school" hopes to achieve. 5 Of course, not all medi-
ation is alike.' 6 The philosophies, styles, and resources of mediators
and mediation programs vary substantially, with some encouraging
behavior far closer to adversarial "settlement work" and others en-
couraging the problem-solving model that Menkel-Meadow advo-
cates. '7
Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm.
L. REV. 366 (1986).
10. See Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach,
11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978).
11. See PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 7; M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964); Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil
Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985).
12. See Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984).
13. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
14. The achievement of legally attainable outcomes may or may not be one of those inter-
ests.
15. There is also extensive literature on negotiation and negotiation styles to which Menkel-
Meadow has been a leading contributor. That literature will not be reviewed here except to say
that among the types of negotiation style described or advocated are "problem-solving" styles.
See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6.
16. Greatbatch & Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a
Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 611, 638 (1989); McEwen & Mai-
man, The Relative Significance of Disputing Forum and Dispute Characteristics for Outcome
and Compliance, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 439 (1986); Sarat, The "New Formalism" in Disputing
and Disputing Research, 21 LAW & Soc'y REV. 695, 697 (1988).
17. For example, an ABA booklet on ADR distinguishes three types of mediation: rights-
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The creation and availability of forums for problem-solving or for
predictive settlement activity do not, of course, guarantee that parties
and/or their lawyers will behave accordingly in and around them.
Some lawyers may engage in problem-solving settlement negotiation
after an arbitration, and some litigants may argue the merits of their
legal cases in mediation. However, institutional frameworks provide
important messages to individuals about expectations for behavior,
and the hope of some ADR advocates has been that new forums
would encourage a shift from reliance on adversarial negotiating be-
havior to problem-solving negotiating behavior. To understand the ex-
tent of transformation or co-optation, then, we must examine which
kinds of forums the ADR movement has created and what their im-
pact, in fact, has been on the negotiating approaches of lawyers and
litigants.
II. "ADR" AND THE ADVERSARY CULTURE
This distinction among types of ADR forums requires that we re-
fine the broad hypothesis that ADR has been co-opted by the culture
of adversarialness. If we accept the proposition that the ADR forums
that promote predictive settlement processes simply extend the adver-
sarial system of litigation and negotiation, then it makes little sense to
expect them to transform the adversary culture. The advocacy of set-
tlement implicit in predictive settlement forums does not rest on a cri-
tique of adjudication or of the adversary process. These forums were
not designed to challenge fundamental assumptions about how to seek
legal solutions to problems, but rather to make the adversarial process
more efficient and less costly to courts or to parties and perhaps also
to reduce its risks by diminishing uncertainty in predictions of possible
outcomes. Thus, rather than being co-opted by the adversary culture,
these predictive ADR processes originate in that very culture and prac-
tice.
ADR's challenge to the "adversary culture" comes instead from
problem-solving settlement forums, in essence from mediation. When
it addresses nonlegal issues and explicitly encourages problem-solving
negotiation, mediation challenges acceptance of the individual and so-
based mediation in which "the goal is to settle the dispute with attention to the identified legal
rights of the parties"; interest-based mediation, which "is more free-wheeling with less attention
given to the individual rights of each party, but with a focus on the interest or compelling issue
of the dispute"; and therapeutic mediation, which "focuses more on the problem-solving skills
of the parties involved. The mediator may emphasize the emotional dimensions of the dispute.
Often, the parties discuss ways of handling similar conflicts in the future." Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An ADR Primer 2 (3d ed.), Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution, American
Bar Association, 1989.
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cial costs of adversarial conduct and of the superiority of adjudicative
solutions (predicted or actual) to disputes.18 It is these problem-solving
processes then-not predictive ADR processes-that might either
transform adversarial conduct or be co-opted by it. Thus, if we are to
look for evidence of co-optation or effective transformation of adver-
sarial practice, it is to the fate of mediation and to its effects, if any,
on the practice of law that we should turn.
III. ADR AND PROBLEM-SOLVING SETTLEMENT
Before doing so, however, we should ask ourselves how two ideo-
logically dissimilar-perhaps opposed-kinds of forums have come to
be described as "ADR." Further, we should ask what the conse-
quences are of collapsing problem-solving and predictive settlement
devices under the same rubric. Let us begin with the second question.
One obvious consequence of the global use of the term ADR is that
people lose track of the distinctions and assume that all ADR is pretty
much the same. This assumption of interchangeability in turn dimin-
ishes the possibility for problem-solving processes to challenge effec-
tively or to transform the adversary culture. Thus, as a social
movement, ADR has not itself been co-opted; it has done the co-opt-
ing. The ADR movement has effectively incorporated and, to some
degree, buried within it the more challenging of its constituent ele-
ments. Problem-solving mediation has become simply another tool in
the ADR tool kit.
Why then have problem-solving and predictive settlement been
merged into a relatively undifferentiated ADR movement? Perhaps
the major force has been the general legal policy support for
settlement 9 and the strong encouragement of settlement by many
judges. 20 If settlement is the goal, distinctions among means of achiev-
ing settlement may be viewed as insignificant except as to their costs,
effectiveness in producing agreements, and acceptance by litigants and
their lawyers.
The rapid development and spread of predictive ADR processes in
the context of this emphasis on settlement may be understood in part
by examining the preference of many lawyers for predictive devices
18. Part of this critique of adjudication may be traced to Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) and Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1979). For a summary of many of the quality arguments challenging adju-
dication, see Sibley & Sarat, supra note 4, at 452-58.
19. See N. RoGERS & C. McEwEN, supra note 2 at 232-33. For a dissenting view about the
wisdom of this policy, see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1983).
20. See Galanter, supra note I1; Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982);
Will, Merhige & Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1977).
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and their discomfort with problem-solving approaches. These prefer-
ences are a product not just of adversarial training, but also of the
character of the law and the nature of legal work and professional
rewards. The law develops most where there is reliable and remunera-
tive legal business. 2' Where the law is most developed, so also is the
business of predicting legal outcomes and maneuvering adversarially
to improve the clients' chances for the best legal outcomes. Where
law, legal business, and legal, adversarial skills are most developed,
there will be the greatest interest in preserving and protecting defini-
tions of disputes consistent with legal solutions. In these areas then,
legal professionals will have the greatest interest, comfort and skill in
developing predictive settlement devices rather than problem-solving
settlement devices. Predictive techniques are the ones that feel most
natural because they both grow from and reinforce the professional
expertise of lawyers. 22
Despite the rise of predictive ADR and absorption of problem-solv-
ing approaches into ADR generally, the distinctions between the two
have not been entirely lost. Legal policy-makers continue to direct cer-
tain classes of legal disputes wholesale to particular kinds of dispute
resolution. All civil cases with dollar values under $10,000 may be sent
to nonbinding arbitration and some large civil cases end up in sum-
mary jury trials or mini-trials, 23 for example, while environmental pol-
icy disputes, 24 interpersonal disputes, 25 family law cases, 26 along with
the smallest of money claims27 and farmer-lender disputes28 may be
directed to mediation.
21. See, e.g., Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'y REV.
115 (1979); Mayhew & Reiss, Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 AM. Soc. REV. 309 (1969).
22. This analysis draws from the rich and varied literature on the legal profession. See gen-
erally R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). For a discussion of the role of bar leaders in forwarding
the development of ADR, see Silbey & Sarat, supra note 4, at 446-50.
23. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPuTE RESOLUTION (1984); G.
BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1986); S. MERNITZ,
MEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A SOURCEBOOK (1980); L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIK-
SHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES
(1987); A. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1983).
25. See, e.g., D. McGLLIS & H. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF POTENTIAL MODELS (1977); Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community-Oriented Citizen Dis-
pute Resolution Programs in the United States, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 75 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Bethel & Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for
Cases of Domestic Violence, 7 VT. L. REV. 15 (1982); Shonholtz, The Citizen's Role in Justice:
Building a Primary Justice and Prevention System at the Neighborhood Level, 494 ANNALS 42
(1987).
26. See, e.g., N. ROGERS & C. McEwEN, supra note 2, at 204; DIVORCE MEDIATION: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE (J. Folberg & A. Milne eds. 1988).
27. See, e.g., W. DEJONG, G. GOOLKASLIN, & D. McG.LIS, THE USE OF MEDIATION AND
[Vol. 19:77
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A major challenge for empirical research and for theory, thus, is to
understand more fully the simultaneous impulses to distinguish ADR
processes and to merge them. We should know, for example, how dif-
ferent kinds of disputes are distributed among predictive and prob-
lem-solving ADR. And we should be prepared to find explanations
when we establish that the distribution is far from random. In other
words, we should be able to explain why some kinds of disputes-of
lawyers, and of courts (or administrative agencies)-are far more
likely to be engaged with predictive processes and others more likely
to be engaged with problem-solving processes.
The most obvious kind of explanation for these sorts of choices and
the resultant distribution of cases focuses on the "inherent" qualities
of the conflicts and parties. These might include, for example,
whether continuing relationships are unlikely or likely, whether the
case is "simple" or "complex," and whether nonparties are affected.
Some cases, it is argued, may simply be more suited to problem-solv-
ing approaches, while others remain best suited to adversarial proc-
esses. 29
Menkel-Meadow voices skepticism, however, about the possibility
of identifying which cases and parties belong in which kinds of disput-
ing processes.30 As she points out, how parties conceive of any partic-
ular dispute evolves over time; disputes are transformed by a variety
of forces.3 Thus, disputes are not concrete, fixed entities that can be
sorted by suitability into different dispute processes. Rather, they are
extremely pliable, and among the major forces shaping them are the
ways legislators, lawyers, and court personnel define them and fit
them into legal categories. That is, disputes may be "different" or
"similar" because the law and legal officials treat them differently or
similarly.
ARBITRATION IN SMALL CLAIMS DISPUTES (1983); McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims
Courts: Consensual Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EF-
FECTIVENESS OF TmHRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 53 (K. Kressel & D. Pruitt eds. 1989).
28. See, e.g., Thompson, Crisis in Rural America: The Genesis of Farmer Lender Media-
tion, NIDR FORUM 3 (Fall, 1990); Willardson, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Farmer-Lender
Disputes: Mandatory Mediation in Minnesota, 5 J. L. & INEQUALITY 487 (1987); Protecting
America's Farmers Under State Mediation Laws and Chapter 12: Who's Being Protected?., 72
MARQ. L. REv. 466 (1989).
29. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, M. GREEN & F. SANDER, DIsPTE RESOLUTION (1985); Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE 25 (R. Tomasic & M. Feeley eds.
1982).
30. See Sarat, supra note 16, at 699. Both Menkel-Meadow and Sarat refer to this as the
"allocation" question-which cases belong in which dispute resolution forum-and suggest the
difficulty of identifying criteria for allocation.
31. See Felstiner, Sarat & Abel, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming and Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 631 (1981); Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Au-
dience and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 775 (1981).
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This observation returns us to an examination of the interests, per-
ceptions, and organization of lawyers and of the law as part of an
explanation of the distribution of case "types" into predictive and
problem-solving ADR. The distribution of case "types" might also,
as Menkel-Meadow hints, be related in part to the organization of in-
terests of client groups such as insurance companies.
Clearly, there remains much to be understood about the ADR
movement as a whole, and the development and use of both predictive
and problem-solving ADR if we are to address the large question of
co-optation raised by Menkel-Meadow. We need to think not just
about the "ADR movement" but to study the relationship between
the "mediation movement" and ADR. We need empirical studies to
learn more about the kinds of cases that are directed to problem-solv-
ing processes as compared to those directed to predictive ADR. We
need to understand the causes of this distribution without assuming
that it stems simply from the adversarial training of lawyers or from
the inherent qualities of disputes.
Ultimately, however, Menkel-Meadow argues that the co-optation
of mediation cannot be fully addressed without looking at the actual
character of the day-to-day practices of negotiation and settlement as
they are influenced by the introduction of problem-solving media-
tion.3 2 So we return to the relationship between mediation and the
practice of law.
IV. LEGAL PRACTICE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING SETTLEMENT
What happens to the practice of law when mediation is interposed
in the litigation process? Does it transform the way lawyers and clients
view problems and seek solutions to them? Or does mediation become
co-opted-merely another step in the adversarial struggle to resolve
disputes?
More particularly, what do lawyers do when their clients are medi-
ating a case? Do they participate directly and take over the mediation,
using it as a forum for making their legal arguments? Or do they en-
courage their clients to take a lead role in discussions focusing on non-
32. Menkel-Meadow also looks at some of the litigation about ADR for evidence of co-
optation. Evidence of litigation about predictive settlement devices tells nothing, of course,
about the co-optation of mediation. Even the emergence of a substantial law of mediation may
say little about its co-optation. See N. RocERS & C. McEwEN, supra note 2. Much, but not all,
of this legalization focuses on the context for mediation, not what happens inside the process. If
problem-solving mediation is the resilient and powerful process that its advocates hope it to be,
its effectiveness in refocusing adversarial negotiation should remain regardless of the changing
and formalizing context in which it takes place. That is why the best evidence about impact must
come from studies of what happens in mediation and of how lawyers approach their practices.
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legal issues? Do lawyers view mediation as a threat to their practice or
as a useful adjunct? Do lawyers perceive mediation as a process that
permits new kinds of solutions to complex problems or as one that
assists traditional, adversarial negotiations focused on likely court
outcomes? Empirical research about such issues can give us a clearer
picture of what happens when the adversarial culture and problem-
solving settlement meet.
Richard Maiman, Lynn Mather, and I are in the midst of just such
a research project, one that examines divorce law practice in Maine
and New Hampshire." In this research, we have interviewed at length
more than 150 lawyers who practice law in the two states. In Maine,
mediation in contested cases involving children has been mandated for
several years, while in New Hampshire, public divorce mediation is
nonexistent and private mediation is rare. Those interviews tell much
about how Maine lawyers have incorporated mediation into their
practices, and they will permit comparisons to the practices of New
Hampshire lawyers who work without mediation.3 4 Some preliminary
observations from the Maine data follow.
How, generally, do Maine divorce lawyers view mediation and re-
port using it? Lawyers almost always attend mediation sessions and
feel free to participate actively in controlling the presentation of the
"case" if the "situation" requires it. The lawyers often view a side-
benefit of mediation to be its potential to tell them about the strength
and character of their adversary's witnesses and evidence. Mediation
also serves strategic purposes in helping move the case along, forcing
otherwise slow-to-act attorneys on the other side to come to the bar-
gaining table and begin the process of settlement.
Lawyers find mediation particularly useful because it helps to have
a third party affirm indirectly the lawyer's advice to a doubting client
that his or her position is unreasonable, that it is unlikely to be sus-
tained in court. Thus, mediation serves as a useful forum for advanc-
ing the work of predictive settlement. Mediation also may permit the
clients to work through issues that the lawyers find unworthy of their
legal expertise or too time-consuming to resolve through lawyer-to-
33. This research is supported by grants from the Law and Social Sciences Program and the
National Science Foundation, SES-8910625, SES-8910649, and SES-8911653. In addition, my
work both on that research and this paper is supported by a Faculty Leave Supplement Grant
from the Faculty Research Committee, Bowdoin College.
34. This research also addresses a wide range of questions other than those posed here. For
a preliminary report of the findings about how Maine lawyers have incorporated mediation into
their practices, see McEwen, Maiman & Mather, The Impact of Mediation on Divorce Law
Practice (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association, Berkeley,
Ca., 1990).
1991]
86 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:77
lawyer negotiation. These include the details of visitation arrange-
ments and "pots and pans issues," that is, haggling over division of
personal property.
Mediation in this view is a useful adjunct to the normal practice of
divorce law." It does not alter the lawyer's focus on predictions of
what courts might do and on appropriate levels of advocacy on behalf
of a client's legal rights. Divorce mediation appears then to have been
at least partly co-opted by the adversary culture.3 6
But this is not the whole story. Many attorneys also see mediation
as an important opportunity for parties to control their own settle-
ments. They note the importance of the parties' direct, face-to-face
participation in a negotiation process that otherwise can depend on
indirect communication through lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations. 7
Many lawyers also emphasize the importance of mediation in high-
lighting nonadversarial values, particularly the values of care of chil-
dren and of consensual settlement when long-term relationships are
likely. Some lawyers concede, too, that this atmosphere at times pro-
motes original solutions to problems, identifies and deals with issues
that attorneys had not thought important, and achieves settlement
where they thought it impossible.
Thus, despite the easy absorption of mediation into divorce law
practice, some things appear to be different as well. At least on occa-
sion, problem-solving settlement occurs in divorce mediation, and
lawyers are party to it. As preliminary as these reports are, therefore,
they suggest complex answers to the simple question about co-opta-
tion. Mediation would appear neither to have been completely co-
opted by, nor to have radically transformed, the "adversary culture"
of divorce practice in Maine.
35. It is quite clear at this early point in our data analysis that individual divorce lawyers
differ substantially in their views about adversarialness in the divorce context. They are almost
universal, however, in affirming "what a court would do" as at least one significant frame of
reference in approaching a divorce case.
36. In fact, these aspects of co-optation may help explain the relative success and staying
power of mandatory mediation in Maine. In addition, lawyers have discovered that mandatory
mediation has not produced the awful consequences feared in states where such changes have
either been resisted or not proposed. Rather than losing business, attorneys often are concerned
that they must bill more hours for divorces because of the time of attendance at mediation ses-
sions. Attorneys in Maine participate in the process rather than being removed from it. As a
consequence, attorneys have been among the chief supporters of continued funding of state-
sponsored mediation services in the face of threatened funding cutbacks. For some discussion of
these issues, see McEwen & Maiman, Coercion and Consent: A Tale of Two Court Reforms, 10
LAW & POL'Y 3 (1988).
37. Our evidence appears consistent with other research that reports significant levels of
negotiation directly between clients in divorce cases. See Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, Participa-




These complex answers suggest reconsideration of the questions we
ask about the relationship between ADR and the adversary culture.
The first step in reformulating those questions is to differentiate
among ADR processes by distinguishing predictive from problem-
solving settlement devices. As we have seen, most ADR techniques
spring directly from the adversary culture because they focus on pre-
dicting court outcomes as the basis for settlement. Only mediation has
the potential to encourage a broader problem-solving approach to set-
tlement, but that potential may be diminished by the tendency to treat
all ADR processes as interchangeable.
Having differentiated ADR processes from one another, we can
also see more clearly both the significance and the irony of framing
the issue as a contest between adversarial/predictive techniques and
problem-solving techniques, with the assumption of a winner or loser.
As Menkel-Meadow acknowledges, the zeal for advocacy is as legiti-
mate as the zeal for problem-solving settlement. Not everyone shares
her view, however, and this disagreement lies at the heart of some of
the most heated debates about ADR.
An "either-or" sense of this issue runs through many of the most
powerful critiques of ADR, critiques that seem directed in fact largely
at the ideology or practice of problem-solving settlement. 8 These cri-
tiques generally argue that by diminishing the role of advocates and of
legal rights and protections, and by focusing on the parties' needs and
interests as the basis for resolution, problem-solving settlement threat-
ens to disadvantage and thus to harm weaker parties.
But is the choice between advocacy and problem-solving so stark?
Our study of divorce lawyers hints at the capacity of problem-solving
processes to integrate rather than to exclude lawyers, and of the abil-
ity of lawyers to balance problem-solving with adversarial and rights-
oriented approaches. What we may be seeking is a more complex pro-
fessional role for lawyers, one in which they balance problem-solving
and advocacy. We must also extend our understanding of whether and
38. See, e.g., Silbey & Sarat, supra note 4 (a critique of ADR that focuses attention on the
ideology of problem-solving dispute settlement but seems to identify it with all of ADR). Laura
Nader has also identified a "harmony ideology" with ADR generally, even though it seems con-
fined to problem-solving dispute processes. Her critiques of ADR extend far beyond a concern
with this ideology, however. See L. NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A
ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990); Nader, The ADR Explosion: The Implications of Rhetoric
in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. (1989); Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic Be-
tween Legality and Its Alternatives: The Limits of Binary Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 621
(1984).
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how processes like mediation permit and encourage the balancing of
these perspectives.
In prompting these questions, beginning the debate, and pointing
toward an integrative resolution, Carrie Menkel-Meadow has chal-
lenged us to think more clearly about the values and goals of a varied
justice system and about the relationships between the institutional re-
forms of ADR and the day-to-day practices of lawyers who remain
central in translating the ideals of change into reality.
